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“As you know well, without documents it is strictly prohibited for any person
to exist”
Poligraph Poligraphovich Sharikov
In this note I explain how far the case of Tjebbes, where the Court of Justice has
agreed in principle with stripping EU citizens residing abroad of their EU citizenship
status and EU democratic rights based on non-renewal of the passport, showcases
the dangerous limits to the understanding of the concept of citizenship by the
Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice. Absent any necessity to do so, the Court
nevertheless managed to open the EU law door to endorsing the downgrade of EU
integration to irrelevance for a large number of individuals selected, based on a
combination of untenable logic denying citizenship’s abstract legal nature and the
operation of foreign – Iranian, Canadian, and Swiss – law in the context of depriving
EU citizens themselves any agency, their dignity forgotten, since the holders of
several citizenships are stigmatized in principle.
It is old news that the logic of apartheid européen, to quote Balibar, is at the core of
the EU integration project, where the whole idea of the EU as a common working-
living space is only open to those in possession of the formal status of citizenship.
Unlike in any other constitutional system around the world the rights to reside, work,
and not to be discriminated against are de facto and also de jure purely citizenship-
as opposed to residence-based. Applying this same logic to dual national EU citizens
is quite new, however.
To downgrade EU citizenship, while its significance is so absolutely all-
encompassing, to an unfriendly subscription service under the pretext of respecting
the separation of powers between the Member States and the EU is an unwelcome
move. The fact that it has been done by the Court in an almost elegant fashion
makes it tragically comical. Akin to Bulgakov’s ‘Poligraph Poligraphovich’ caring to
acquire a passport and a municipal housing registration while failing to grasp the
limits of own humanity – the proletarian was a laboratory dog turned semi-human
– the Court steers clear of the core ideas underlying the issue at hand, as I explain
below outlining a selection of ten tragic misunderstandings earning this case a solid
place in the hall of fame of the most intricately dubious tours de force of the highest
Court in Europe. A substantive issue of fundamental importance for the very essence
of EU integration is misrepresented as a procedural discussion, where anything –
especially the denial of legally-endorsed Europeanness, i.e. EU citizenship – is in
principle allowed for no EU-law-compatible reasons. Proportionality is deployed to
undermine the essence of the law: what the late Professor Tsakirakis was weary of
and what George Letsas has problematized with splendid precision. Deaf to Vicky
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Jackson’s warning calls, the ECJ is not ‘proportionate about proportionality’. Tjebbes
is thus in line with the dubious case-law showcased best by Opinion 2/13, where
the core substantive constitutional question is ignored in favour of largely irrelevant
procedural considerations, as Piet Eeckhout has brilliantly demonstrated. By
sacrificing the very legal nature of its citizenship while safeguarding no substantive
interest EU law emerges, yet again, as lacking the Rule of Law.
Annihilating the ‘fundamental’ in the ‘fundamental
legal status’
I have been subscribed to the New Yorker for almost 20 years – it is a great
periodical, but I sometimes end up reading LRB and NYRB instead, leaving the issue
of the New Yorker unwrapped. The idea of having it is great: one day, during a trip
far away, on board, say, of Air Calin, or Air Tahiti Nui, I will definitely read several
issues at once. At least believing in this, coupled with the kindness of the publisher’s
dutiful reminders, make me keep the subscription. I take the decision. Great journals
are cheap, so every time a reminder “your subscription is about to expire” comes
from New York, I renew without hesitation.
This is not how Dutch and, by extension, European citizenship works, as we learned
from Tjebbes. At issue was the fact that under the Dutch law the state does not
remind you that you are about to be thrown out of the body of citizenry for no reason
other than failure to submit non-self-evident paperwork. Somewhat similar to a well-
known Slovenian example (see Kuri# and others), the Dutch state simply erases
you in some cases. Of course, your Europeanness goes too, together with your
Nederlanderschap. All those residing outside of the EU, who got several citizenships
and have not renewed the passport for ten years or have not filled in an online form
that they are interested in remaining Dutch, as it were, are potentially affected.
‘The right to have rights’, as well as the very membership of the national political
community – pace Delvigne – is thus made dependent on some kind of a renewal,
which is new (the law has been effective since 2013), counterintuitive (other Member
States do not require anything similar), and, crucially, of which the state does not
remind you. At the deepest level Tjebbes is direct denial of both the ‘sovereign
citizen’ logic, akin to the one formulated by the US Supreme Court in Afroyim v
Rusk (the branches of government are but custodians of popular sovereignty, so
undoing citizens is not in their power) and the ‘citizenship as a human right’ logic,
as formulated, most recently, by Peter Spiro. EU citizens emerge as hostages at the
whim of those in power.
What makes the whole story trickier is that an ordinary Dutch passport is valid
precisely for 10 years (unlike the 5 year term, in force when the law in question
entered into effect). Not renewing your passport ahead of expiration can thus result
in the annulment of citizenship ex lege if you reside abroad and have some other
citizenship. This is a particularly low-threshold test for losing nationality, making
Dutch citizenship easier to lose even than the British – one of the global leaders
on this count. In Brexit UK it is enough that the Secretary of State is of the opinion
that your being a citizen is not in the interests of the UK: we all heard abundantly
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about it in the recent cases of ISIS wives and other terrorists and terror-sympathizers
(e.g. Shamima Begum). Cypriot citizenship is equally easy to lose as the Dutch: on
Cyprus it is apparently enough to sell a house to lose citizenship. Compared with
taking part in and actively supporting rape, pillage and killings by radical Islamists,
or selling a house you promised to keep, the Dutch standard seems to be a joke,
which is not funny: fail to renew the passport before the expiration date and your
citizenship evaporates. The ECJ has agreed in principle to allow the treatment of
law-abiding EU citizens, which is worse than the treatment reserved for known
terrorists.
If citizenship’s one right is the right to return home (and not to be deported from
there) – in the case of EU citizenship, to return to the EU and remain in its territory,
as per Ruiz Zambrano and its progeny – after Tjebbes we now know that this right
alongside with all the other rights of importance abroad, such as voting in European
elections and, where available, diplomatic protection, now can simply expire. That
‘Article 20 TFEU, read in the light of Articles 7 and 24 of the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union, must be interpreted as not precluding legislation of a
Member State such as that at issue in the main proceedings’ (the ruling in Tjebbes)
is the new low of EU citizenship law, which will be difficult for the Court to beat in the
future.
It is unquestionable, as the ECJ has underlined on numerous occasions (also
Tjebbes para. 30), that EU citizenship’s acquisition and possession must have due
regard of EU law even though it follows a ius tractum – derivative – logic with the
Member States themselves obviously responsible for the grant, both of the national
and of European citizenship to those who do not have another EU nationality. As
per Micheletti, Rottmann and the very logic of EU federalism, as Daniel Sarmiento,
among others, has explained in abundant detail and as has been discussed by the
Court in depth in Rottmann, Member States’ competences in this field, although
of fundamental importance, are not absolute. The crucial lesson of Rottmann is
that EU citizenship is maturing into a possible trigger of the ECJ’s jurisdiction. As
reconfirmed in Tjebbes, those situations where EU citizenship status is potentially
jeopardized by the issuing Member State fall, ‘by reason of [their] nature and [their]
consequences, within the ambit of EU law’ (para. 32). Tjebbes does not formally
contradict the established case law. It renders it substantively irrelevant. The
far-reaching poisonous potential of Tjebbes is clear: EU citizenship made dependent
on the renewal of a passport before its expiration is NOT a ‘fundamental status of the
nationals of the Member States’.
It is, in principle, OK, the Court of Justice tells us, to punish the non-renewal of
a passport with the annulment of citizenship. In failing to build on the spirit of the
law as it stands and de facto erasing the long-cherished fundamental nature of the
legal status at issue, Tjebbes boasts humongous negative potential in our populist
times: Only the ‘real’ Dutchmen will remain citizens. By definition instead of killing
off EU citizenship as such, as the learned AG seemingly proposed in his Opinion
marked by absolute deference to the Member States, the Court opted for vagueness
poorly masking the absolute lack of principle. While the basic approaches outlined in
Rottmann, Eman and Sevinger and Micheletti (which Sir Richard Plender and I have
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critically analysed elsewhere) seemingly hold, the Court, by NOT making a principled
stance against an indefensible discriminatory policy of a Member State well known
from recent case-law of the same Court for its particularly untenable treatment of
citizens and residents, turned all the possible arguments on their head. The disaster
of losing EU citizenship based on an ex lege annulment, which comes without any
warning and based on no wrong-doing, is presented as reasonable per se, since
the form to retain citizenship is ‘so easy to fill in’ to remain a citizen: the fact, which
the AG has so clearly and misguidedly underlined. The absurdity of a presumption
that someone is less Dutch and less European as a result of staying outside of the
Union if – and only if – that person has another citizenship and does not fill in some
obscure form does not strike the Court as somewhat frivolous.
The Dutch submission concerning the lack of ‘genuine link’ with the state of those
who do not reside in the EU is recited uncritically. This is a radical departure from
Eman and Sevinger, where the same government deployed the same logic with the
only difference that instead of discriminating against those with no ‘genuine link’
concerned the Dutch residing in the Dutch Caribbean, as opposed to anywhere
else in the world. This approach to equality was not accepted by the Court, which
deployed the general principle of equality between the Dutch on Aruba and
Melbourne and New York, to strike down the absurd ‘genuine links’ logic. In Tjebbes,
by contrast, the Court agrees that EU citizens with a Swiss citizenship residing
abroad are radically different, from EU citizens without Swiss citizenship residing
abroad, making the continuous enjoyment of the supranational status dependent on
the lack of a foreign citizenship. EU citizenship, thus, is not at all idiot-proof for
an idiotic reason: A Swiss-Dutch in Switzerland is apparently less European than a
Dutch in Switzerland and the Court does not see any problem with this.
10 select absurdities underlying the fail
Defiance to national rules, however absurd, is the key guiding star of the Grand
Chamber in Tjebbes. Not a behavior one would expect of a constitutional court
caring about its system, if it leads to the denial of the only thing the EU legal order
can offer a citizen: the status of citizenship with all its rights and protections.
The judgment raises a number of (interrelated) burning questions/problematic
assumptions about the nature of citizenship, which are of immediate importance
including (but not limited to, given its all-round disastrous impact) the following
interrelated ten:
1. Renewed ideological mischaracterization of citizenship as a ‘Special
relationship of solidarity and good faith’ (para. 33): if EU citizens are those
who are nationals of the Member States, it is clear that the status cannot
depend, legally speaking, on any ‘bonds of solidarity’, since not feeling such a
bond does not undo a nationality of a Member State, making the statement –
an ideologically charged submission of the German government repeated from
Rottmann – factually incorrect. What is at stake in Tjebbes is whether failing
to renew a passport should undo one’s EU citizenship: The Court does not do
the job of explaining how someone’s Swiss or Iranian citizenship undermines
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solidarity and good faith anywhere in the Union. The answer why the Court
does not go there is clear: because it is obvious that the possession of Swiss or
Iranian nationality does not undermine any special legal relationship between
the EU and its citizens. And if this is true, then it is precisely the task of the
Court of Justice to defend EU citizens stripped of the status on a phony pretext,
when the situation by ‘its very nature and consequences’ falls within the scope
of EU law. The law is such, once again, that citizenship is an abstract legal
bond: those who believe in solidarity are citizens and those who do not, are
citizens as well.
2. Regrettable goal of the protection of ‘reciprocity of rights and duties’
(para. 33): while it could be tenable in the context of some Member State
nationalities, for instance the Greek one, given that Greece boasts one of the
largest per capita conscript militaries in the world, this 19th-century-inspired
‘reciprocity’ cannot apply to EU citizenship, which knows no duties as per the
text of Part II TFEU. In this context national claims to the existence of such
‘reciprocities’ should be seriously scrutinized: what if a Member State is simply
willing to disenfranchise a particular group under this pretext (which was a
classical deployment of citizenship duties since Dred Scott)? Even if the harmful
legend is somehow convincing to some, it remains unclear how turning EU
citizenship into a subscription operation would actually further such ‘reciprocity’?
If the only duty that arises in Tjebbes is the duty to renew the passport, can it
be wholeheartedly argued that this duty really be commensurable with the rights
of EU and national citizenship? And what if there were no such duties (consider
the case of mono-national Dutch EU citizens abroad) – would the ECJ then
exclude such ‘duty-less’ citizens from rights?
3. Regrettable connection between enjoyment of EU citizenship and
residence. Why does residence in a particular place suddenly come to be of
crucial significance for the enjoyment of the status of EU citizenship? None
of the relevant provisions in the Treaties makes such a connection, rendering
it dubious from the outset; presupposing that EU law frowns at its citizens’
travel and stays around the world would be equally unacceptable outright. The
Court has already pointed at the legal difficulty relating to such framing of EU
citizenship in Eman and Sevinger. In that case the Court has unconditionally
confirmed that EU citizenship does NOT expire upon leaving the territory of
the Union and continues as a fundamental legal status of the nationals of the
Member States. In contrast, Tjebbes presents leaving the Union as potentially
problematic in the light of the possession of the status of EU citizenship, which
is untenable. The conceptual separation between the status of citizenship
and the concept of residence unquestionably requires avoiding the confusion
between the two. This is in particular due to the fact that many EU citizenship
rights are not territorial in essence and can thus be enjoyed abroad too,
including the right to benefit from the general principle of non-discrimination,
as in Eman and Sevinger, which the Grand Chamber seems to have totally
forgotten.
4. Regrettable exclusion of those residing abroad from body politic. Those
residing abroad enjoy full membership of body politic – since, even in the
Netherlands – voting from abroad is a citizenship right as well, thus extending
to European Parliament elections. Tjebbes’ silence on this matter is very
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problematic, since the body politic is obviously not a fully territorial idea in EU
law, while the deprivation of EU citizenship is now potentially territorialized.
5. Regrettable misrepresentation of the link with the state. Why is it that the
legal link with the EU – EU citizenship – remains a legal bond only for those
who do not have any other citizenship, turning into a check of residence for all
the dual nationals? Should the ‘genuine link’ imply some cultural baggage –
like the humiliating knowledge of the answers to the dull Dutch naturalization
tests – the possession of a different nationality cannot matter: it follows that
the ‘genuine link’ implied in Tjebbes is thus obviously not substantively cultural.
This said – and given that the body politic is not necessarily territorial, just as
the rights of EU citizenship are not – the claim of the Dutch government that
the ‘genuine link’ connecting the Kingdom of the Netherlands with its citizens is
in some way dependent on residence in a particular place in the world is not a
logical conclusion. Tjebbes is an approving nod in the direction of an argument
that does not stand, failing to capture the essence of citizenship.
6. Direct discrimination based on second nationality as a starting point
emerges as a related problem. Why is direct discrimination between different
groups of nationals of a particular Member State residing outside of the EU
– the one outlawed in Eman and Sevinger –now allowed in principle? While
Micheletti prohibited the undermining of EU rights of EU citizens with a third
country nationality in the territory of the Union, the Court has reversed this in
Tjebbes for those who are resident outside of EU territory, taking discrimination,
rather than non-discrimination as the starting point, the soundness of which is
dubious.
7. Regrettable misrepresentation of the geography of European integration.
Why is the territory of rights confined to EU Treaty-based rights, as opposed
to EU international agreements-based rights? Given that residence and work
in Switzerland is one of the rights which EU citizens enjoy under the relevant
bilateral agreement, to present Switzerland (or any EEA county with the sole
exception of Liechtenstein) as radically different from an EU Member State on
this count seems to amount to a misrepresentation of the legal-political reality
on the ground, which is regrettable, given the depth of the level of integration
achieved between Switzerland and the EU.
8. Regrettable presumption of desirability of mono-nationality. EU law is
mute on the number of nationalities EU citizens should be allowed to hold to
remain connected to the Union. While the Member States could have different
ideas on this matter, the Court of Justice could be reasonably expected to
protect the interests of the Union by ensuring that one does not face a situation
of being forced to renounce other nationalities which have been acquired
in full compliance with the law in order not to be subjected to unjustifiable,
unnecessary, and discriminatory EU citizenship annulments. Para. 46 of
Tjebbes thus sends a deeply problematic signal, especially given the growing
toleration of the cumulation of nationalities all around the world and the solid
nature of both human rights and sovereignty arguments in favour of such
toleration as discussed above.
9. Absurd reliance on foreign law. Even accepting the problematic assumption
of desirability of mono-national populations, why is the continuous possession
of EU citizenship made dependent on the law of other states extending (or not)
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and/or allowing to renounce (or not) their particular nationalities to the Dutchmen
residing abroad? How is the autonomous supranational legal order come to be
subject, in essence, to the law of the third countries? And if possessing a non-
renounceable nationality has to be tolerated and is thus obviously not really
harmful, how could the subjection of a continued possession of EU citizenship to
a renunciation requirement applied to a renounceable nationality be justified?
10. Misconceived references to international law. The Court refers to the
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (Arts. 6 and 7(3) to 7(6))
and Convention on Nationality (Arts 7(1)(e) and (2)), in a most problematic
fashion, while allowing for the loss of nationality in the contexts covered by
the Dutch law, these have nothing to say about EU citizenship. The Court
simply pretends as if EU citizenship is merely a couple of additional rights on
top of the nationality of the Member State, denying it an independent status,
thus saying goodbye to the prevalent characterization of the status in the
literature, rooted in the Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro in Rottmann, where EU
citizenship has rightly been characterized as ‘autonomous’. Instead of critically
engaging with the essential principled short-comings of the international law
invoked by the Member State in defence of its policy having potentially harmful
effects for the project of European unity, the Court simply restates the dubious
provisions, which are by definition not designed to take EU citizenship into
account. Tjebbes is thus in logical opposition to Kadi or Micheletti, representing
a worrisome account of a truly uncritical reading of international law potentially
at the expense of EU law’s autonomy.
The puzzling nature of the ECJ’s proportionality:
individual circumstances of what?
Unwilling to confront the unjustifiable assumptions behind the directly discriminatory
subscription EU citizenship in principle, the Court opted for a humble questioning
strictly confined to its effects. Para. 41 of the judgment is crucial in this regard. The
Court stated that ‘the loss of the nationality of a Member State by operation of law
would be inconsistent with the principle of proportionality if the relevant national
rules did not permit at any time an individual examination of the consequences
of that loss for the persons concerned from the point of view of EU law’ (para.
41). But against which benchmarks? That not renewing your passport one day
before it expired annuls one’s mystical ‘genuine link’ with the Netherlands? From
Micheletti we know that genuine links are not a tolerated part of EU law, which is
in conformity with the framing of citizenship in International Law, as Peter Spiro
has shown. Moreover, assessing ‘genuine links’ would not be acceptable, since
this would deny EU citizenship its abstract legal nature. As Christian Joppke has
outlined in detail, where citizenship is legalistic and procedural, the only ‘link’ one
might have with a state is precisely the official decision granting citizenship, since
residing in a particular place or speaking a particular language could not be framed
as enforceable duties of citizenship outside of atrocious totalitarian regimes. The
check of the personal circumstances in the context of proportionality assessment is
thus bound to amount to looking at the reasons why someone who possesses other
nationalities than the Dutch has not renewed the passport of the Netherlands before
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the document expired. While seemingly elegant and forward looking, at its core the
paragraph is thus devoid of substance at its best, since the Court failed to reaffirm
any of the acceptable substantive principles in the context of EU law against which
such individual assessment could possibly take place, thus undermining the very
idea of a meaningful engagement. The fact that only dual nationals are presumed
to have lost their ‘genuine link’ with the EU as a result of not renewing the passport
immediately is not even mentioned, just as the abstract and legal nature of the link
required, reinforcing the intellectually vacant rationalizing of the Dutch government at
the expense of the idea of European unity and law.
That the Court sensed that this be the case cannot be doubted: para. 46, where it
reaffirms discrimination between dual and single Member State nationals is the core
element of the judgment. Among the ‘circumstances of the individual situation of
the person concerned’ outlined by the Court are ‘limitations when exercising [the]
right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, including,
depending on the circumstances, particular difficulties in continuing to travel to the
Netherlands or to another Member State in order to retain genuine and regular links
with members of his or her family, to pursue his or her professional activity or to
undertake the necessary steps to pursue such activity. Also relevant are (i) the fact
that the person concerned might not have been able to renounce the nationality
of a third country […] and (ii) serious risk, to which the person concerned would
be exposed, that his or her safety or freedom to come and go would substantially
deteriorate because of the impossibility for that person to enjoy consular protection
under Article 20(2)(c) TFEU in the territory of the third country in which that person
resides’.
Besides hinting at substantive conditions to be met for the enjoyment of the very
EU citizenship status, the Court states also that ‘[t]hose consequences cannot
be hypothetical or merely a possibility’ (para. 44), thus disqualifying the abstract
nature of the citizenship status. Para. 46 with the list drafted by the Court, which
seems so logical at the first glance is thus absolutely irrelevant in essence. The
very enjoyment of the legal status of EU citizenship is made dependent, for a
heterogeneous minority group (10% of the population) of dual Dutch nationals, on
the use of the rights the status brings, thus, beyond discriminatory essence of the
rule, denying in principle the abstract legal nature of a bond between the Union and
its citizens.
The untold story: Dual EU citizenship
The negative effects of possessing a number of nationalities, rather than one, are
well known and have been, in the case of EU nationalities, excellently documented
by David de Groot as far as the enjoyment of EU citizenship rights is concerned.
To hear that even the status of citizenship can be in jeopardy as a result of having
a Moroccan grandfather or an Iranian background – as one of the applicants in
Tjebbes – is something new however. To make matters worse, the Court is silent
on the loss of EU nationalities, while the AG endorses this in principle on a number
of occasions (e.g. para. 93 of the Opinion), where he speaks about the fact that the
operation of the same law, which is at issue in Tjebbes to the citizens of several
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EU Member States simultaneously is not a problem. This approach, besides being
deeply counterproductive from the point of view of EU values in that it disregards
both the human rights and the sovereign citizen logic, is short of shocking for two key
reasons.
Firstly, it is based on the assumption that acquiring a second EU nationality is not
worthy per se, thus undermining the very logic of the Union as a supranational
constitutional system ensuring, through the unity in diversity, that the citizens benefit
from the supranational law, their legal heritage, to refer to the classical van Gend en
Loos directly, taking crucial decisions about where and how to live their lives in the
context of the whole territory of the internal market: Member State nationalities thus
give access to rights in the whole territory of the EU not a particular Member State,
forming an intricate web of ‘intercitizenships’ as I have argued elsewhere. To imply
that cumulation of Member State nationalities is somehow a hostile act on behalf
of EU citizens, which should be acted upon contradicts the very logic of integration
and cannot, thus, be endorsed by the highest Court, even en passant, as if it does
not matter. It does, and I explained why in the pages of the European Law Journal
several years ago.
Even worse, secondly, the endorsement of the loss of the original Member State
nationality by EU citizens who make use of their free movement rights punishes
those who chose to naturalize in a new Member State thus taking a decision
to take full part in the political life of that Member State. Before the problem of
disenfranchisement of EU citizens who use their free movement rights has not been
solved and national elections are not within the realm of EU law – which might never
happen of course – it is impossible to make a convincing argument for the toleration
of the loss of the original nationality as a result of naturalizing elsewhere in the EU.
Such toleration pushes EU citizens to make a choice between the original nationality
and taking part in political life in the place where they reside. To make matters
worse, EU citizens are presented with this choice for no defensible reason, which
makes it unacceptable in principle.
Back to Poligraph Poligraphovich
The true essence of things tends to reveal itself at a certain point. Just as Poligraph
Poligraphovich in The Heart of a Dog, then already in possession of a passport and
a municipal housing registration, turned back into a stray dog towards the end of
the novella, EU citizenship’s abstract legal nature will unquestionably survive the
regrettable absurdity of Tjebbes. Awaiting common sense one can only restate
that punishing those who fail to renew a passport worse than known terrorists,
jihadists and ISIS wives, denying them the legal connection with the EU and the
rights to be enjoyed in the Internal Market, while opening a possibility to weigh this
punishment against the use of the rights they are precisely being deprived of for no
reason at all and in the interest of no stated EU-related common good, in the context
where such use cannot be ‘hypothetical or merely a possibility’ is undoubtedly a
moment significantly undermining the EU integration project. European citizens
deserve better. Denying the abstract nature of citizenship, directly discriminatory and
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stripping dual nationals of dignity as a starting assumption, Tjebbes is without any
doubt among the high points of intellectual shame.
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